[unity07]

President Kibaki and Raila Odinga have shamelessly placed their political rivalry and their own ambitions ahead of Kenya's peace and stability, to say nothing of its fledgling status as a democracy. The US Must be pragmatic enough to realize that without serious efforts to hold Kibaki and Odinga personally responsible for their actions, the latest grand compromise has only postponed the crisis.

There is much the US can do to help make sure that the timeline for reforms is met. The Kenyan parliament must pass four key pieces of legislation: the national accord and reconciliation bill, the constitutional amendment bill, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, and the creation of the ethnic relations commission of Kenya.

The state department should quickly deploy technical assistance to help the parliament complete the bills in a form that is consistent with the power-sharing agreement. The US should also anticipate the distribution of cabinet ministries as a potential stumbling block. The US has wide-ranging interests in Kenya that both constrain and create points of leverage for US diplomacy. The US should be prepared to address violations of the power-sharing agreement, which would threaten the country's stability.

Limits on intelligence-sharing or military cooperation would be self-defeating, since cooperation on counter-terrorism is vital. General aid or trade sanctions often hurt the population and serve as a very blunt instrument for changing individual behavior. However, there is a case for ensuring that US non-military assistance flows primarily through Kenyan civil society rather than as direct budget support to government ministries. U.S. public statements can also make clear that future assistance will be deployed only to the degree that Kenya's political environment is conducive to achieving development goals.

Kenya has utilized duty-free trade status with the US under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (agoa). Although there are human rights standards attached to agoa, withdrawing this trade benefit would merely undercut the country's broad economic growth and harm the average Kenyan. A quick change in Kenya's agoa status might also discourage foreign direct investment elsewhere in Africa as companies depend on stable and long-term access to export markets. US public diplomacy must be prepared to name and shame obstructionists who would thwart progress on Kenya's post-crisis recovery. However, the US must be prepared to go further.

The state department should publicly announce its intention to hold accountable those leaders who would undermine the power-sharing accord. US interventions must be swift and clearly aimed at isolating individuals. Care must be taken to explain that US actions are not generalized sanctions, but rather are aimed at individuals blocking progress on the accords. Individual sanctions should come in the form of US Travel restrictions and freezing of US-based personal assets. The US. Embassy should chair a committee of key donor countries in Nairobi to ensure prompt united action against individuals who impede implementation. These decisions should not await African Union (au) support, but consultations with the AU should be routine.

The dependents of obstructionists should also be included in US Visa bans, depending on the severity of the offense. Further instigation of ethnic violence would certainly qualify. Kenya's post-election ethnic violence demands close investigation and accountability. Deferring justice will only sow the seeds for the next round of ethnic clashes. The parliamentary bills that are part of the power-sharing agreement provide a framework for, and must be taken seriously as a key part of, Kenya's return to peace and lasting stability. Withholding international military education and training from Kenyan military personnel would hurt US Interests more than it could possibly punish political leaders, and Kenya's cooperation on counter-terrorism is among the united states' most important relationships in Africa.

However, Kenya's political stability should be considered when it comes to looking at a regional platform for the new Africa command. Conclusion US diplomatic leadership in Kenya is essential for the stability of a regional power, efforts to fight terrorism in East Africa, and Africa's forward momentum as a democratic continent. The humanitarian component is an important part of the US official response in Kenya, but it is nowhere near sufficient. This is not a call for special envoys or new initiatives, but rather a hard look at the need for successful implementation of Kenya's new power-sharing arrangement. The AU and the UN must support the Kibaki-Odinga deal signed February 28, but this by itself is a recipe for a certain unraveling. As Kenya undertakes the long road back to political stability, the devil will be in the details, from required parliamentary legislation to cabinet appointments.

US Ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger, assistant secretary Jendayi Frazer, and secretary rice should remain deeply engaged and make clear that the US will not countenance the use of ethnic violence as a political tool and will not allow individuals to place their political ambitions ahead of Kenya's future as a stable, peaceful, and democratic country.